Abstract. Physiologists and historians are still debating what conceptually differentiates each of the three major modern theories of regulation: the constancy of the milieu inte´rieur, homeostasis and allostasis. Here I propose that these models incarnate two distinct regimes of politization of the life sciences. This perspective leads me to suggest that the historicization of physiological norms is intrinsic to the allostatic model, which thus divides it fundamentally from the two others. I analyze the allostatic model in the light of the Canguilhemian theory, showing how the former contributed to the development of a critical epistemology immune to both naturalist essentialism and social constructivism. With a unique clarity in the history of physiology, allostasis gives us a model of the convergence of historical epistemology and scientific practice. As such it played a key role in codifying the epistemological basis of certain current research programs that, in the fields of social epidemiology and feminist neuroscience, promote what we name here a critical physiology.
preme biological fact'' (Canguilhem, 1974, p. 3, our translation) . Even so, we are far from a consensus about how conceptualize these factswitness the diverse notions that have succeeded each other in the course of the 20th century: the constancy of the milieu inte´rieur (Bernard, 1872); dynamogenesis (Richet, 1900) ; homeostasis (Cannon, 1929) ; heterostasis (Selye, 1975) ; allostasis (Sterling and Eyer, 1988) ; and homeodynamism (Rose, 1997) . All these approaches are still under debate.
For the advocates of a continuous history, one without ruptures (Selye, 1975; Sinding, 1991; Dallman, 2003) , these concepts all reference identical physiological mechanisms. For the school that recognizes ruptures (Sterling, Eyer, 1988; Rose, 1997; McEwen and Wingfield, 2010) , the history of regulation has been marked by a rejection of the normocentricity of Claude Bernard's model (1879). Insisting on the constancy of the milieu inte´rieur, the father of modern physiology took as his foundation a fixed and normative conception of the organism (Canguilhem, 1978 (Canguilhem, [1966 ; Rose, 1997), which proved incapable of accounting for the adaptability of living organisms. Peter Sterling and Joseph Eyer (1988) worked in this interpretive line when they regrounded the homeostatic model by introducing the concept of allostasis, understood as ''the stability of the organism through change' ' (Sterling and Eyer, 1988, p. 636) .
Here I intend to show that all regulation theories, in their own way, presuppose the fact that the organism can only maintain its stability if it is modifiable. If, then, there is a rupture introduced by the concept of allostasis, it cannot rest solely on the question of physiological plasticity. In order to come to grips with this fact, I propose that we should not pick out the idea of physiological plasticity as the differentiating factor that identifies these distinct regulation theories. Instead, we should examine the types of political rationality that structure them, and confer on organic variability a particular epistemological status.
I propose to this end to construct a historical epistemology of the three key concepts in the history of modern biological regulation: constancy of the milieu inte´rieur (Bernard, 1879), homeostasis (Cannon, 1929) and allostasis (Sterling and Eyer, 1988) . Each of these notions has been persistently injected into the normal language of physiology and in contradistinction from Bernard's idea, the two latter entertain an intimate bond with political issues. Methodologically, it is a question of not limiting the inquiry to the analysis of the sociological and macroshistorical determinants, at the risk of excessively politicizing the collectivity of naturalist discourse. It is a question, rather, of analysing, at a granular level, how the concept of homeostasis presupposes a regime of politization of the life sciences, i.e. a certain kind of articulation that
